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Competition and Convenience:
The Emerging Role of Community Reinvestment
MICHAEL E. SCMHADER*
INTRODUCTION
The initial impact of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA or Act)'
on the regulation of financial institutions was neither dramatic nor imme-
diate. The role of the Act, however, is emerging. 2 It is becoming an
increasingly valuable vehicle in the hands of community groups to attack
bank credit policies and, more recently, as a means to challenge bank
mergers and acquisitions. 3 Legislation currently pending before Congress
would increase further the role of the CRA by making an institution's
ability to avail itself of expanded branching and other powers contingent
on the existence of satisfactory community reinvestment records.4 With the
* Ice Miller Donadio & Ryan, Indianapolis, Indiana. J.D., 1990, Indiana University
School of Law at Bloomington; B.A., 1986, Brigham Young University. The author wishes to
thank Sarah Jane Hughes for her comments and guidance on several early drafts of this
Article and also Jeff Kennedy and Tom Ristine for their insights on the development of bank
antitrust and community reinvestment standards, respectively. Any errors or omissions in the
Article are, of course, solely those of the author.
1. Title VIII of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
128, 91 Stat. 1147 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989)).
2. See Dean, Consumer Groups' Mad-Dog Politics, ABA Bankers Weekly 3 (Apr. 30,
1991) (opinion captioned "CRA: Beating the Banks" recognizing the increased role of CRA
and criticizing community groups for, among other things, construing CRA to mean that
"[b]ankers unfortunate enough to serve only middle- and upper-income markets should hunt
down poor people and force feed them credit"); Bachman, Robinson & Hamilin, New Wave
of Acquisitions Raises Regulatory and Structural Issues, Nat'l L.J., June 11, 1990, at 28-29
(noting the increasing importance of CRA compliance in acquisition applications before
regulators); Eisen & Dennen, The Community Reinvestment Act: The Regulators Give It a
New Emphasis, 107 BANING L.J. 334 (1990) (forecasting the continued strengthening of the
CRA to allow consumers an increased role in determining which services financial institutions
can offer).
3. See Schellie, Current Developments with the Community Reinvestment Act, 42 Bus.
LAW. 943, 943, 946 (1987).
4. Under proposed House banking reform bill H.R. 1505, banks would be required "to
meet their community lending responsibilities under the Community Reinvestment Act before
being able to take advantage of the so-called modernization provisions in the bill." House
Banking Keeps Treasury Bill Modernization Provisions Largely Intact, 56 Banking Rep. (BNA)
999, 1000 (May 27, 1991) [hereinafter Bill Modernization]. This would require banks to have,
or agree to obtain within two years, a satisfactory CRA rating. Id. Under the Financial
Institutions Safety and Consumer Choice Act of 1991, H.R. 6, as reported by the House
Committee on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs in August, depository institutions with
interstate branches would be evaluated with respect to CRA compliance on a state-by-state
basis. Financial Institutions Safety and Consumer Choice Act of 1991, H.R. 6, §§ 307-308,
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continued erosion of traditional geographic and service restrictions on
banking institutions,' and the resulting increase in bank merger activity,6
scrutiny under the Act is becoming a factor in balancing community banking
needs against the perceived necessity of larger geographic markets.7
This Article looks at community reinvestment as a factor in the review
of bank merger and acquisition requests. By focusing on the development
of the "convenience and needs" standard' in bank merger evaluations and
the current regulatory climate's apparent flexibility with respect to the
evaluation of competitive factors, this Article concludes, as other commen-
reprinted in Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1402, at 52-53 (Aug. 6, 1991). In connection
with the requirement of separate CRA evaluations, the bill provides that less-than-satisfactory
CRA evaluations would be considered to support a conclusion that branches were being utilized
as "deposit production offices." Id. As such, branches would not function to meet the credit
needs of the community and market area in which they operate, and, therefore, would be
subject to mandatory closure. Id.
5. Until the turn of the century, branching and geographic expansion were nonissues since
the economy and society were highly localized. E. SYMONS & J. WnrrE, BANxcNo LAw 97 (2d
ed. 1984). In 1933, the McFadden Act, ch. 89, § 23, 48 Stat. 189, 190 (1933) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 36), amended the National Bank Act to permit national banks to establish and
acquire branches within the state in which they were located to the same extent that state-
chartered banks were permitted to establish and acquire branches. The Douglas Amendment,
section 3(d) of the Bank Holding Company Act, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d), restricts
acquisitions outside of the state where the acquiror's principal operations are conducted, except
in such instances where the acquisition is specifically authorized by the laws of the state in
which the acquiree was located. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Northeast Bancorp v.
Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159 (1985), upholding the constitutionality of state reciprocity
laws, the number of interstate acquisitions have increased significantly. A review of state
banking laws published in 1989 indicated that most states have adopted some form of legislation
permitting to some extent interstate acquisitions, with only three states continuing to prohibit
interstate acquisitions entirely. DeMott, Mergers and Acquisitions of Banks and Bank Holding
Companies, in BAMNdNG LAW AND REOULAT oN 823, 829-31 (F. Puleo ed. 1990) (citing 8
Banking Expansion Rep. no. 4 (Feb. 20, 1989) and 8 Banking Expansion Rep. no. 19 (Oct.
2, 1989)). See also Bachman, Robinson & Hamlin, supra note 2, at 29 (noting that "[t]he
existing barriers to geographic expansion ... that have limited banks in the past are being
dismantled steadily").
6. One source indicates that between 1985 and 1989 there were more than 200 bank
merger transactions involving more than $35 million each. DeMott, supra note 5, at 828. This
source places the average value of each transaction at approximately $245 million. Id. The
recent announcement of mergers between Chemical Bank Corp. and Manufacturers Hanover
Corp. and between NCNB Corp. and C & S/Sovran Corp. has contributed to speculation that
we are about to enter a period of "bank mega-mergers." Merger of 2 Big Banks in New York
May Be Start of Wave, Wall St. J., July 16, 1991, at Al, col. 6; NCNB, C & S/Sovran Agree
to a $4.26 Billion Merger, Wall St. J., July 22, 1991, at A3, col. 1.
7. For an example of the perceived decline of purely local banking markets and the need
for regional markets, see Beat 'Em or Join 'Em: Community Bankers in Midwest Face
Superregional Challenge, Am. Banker, Jan. 12, 1990, at 1.
8. The concept of "convenience and needs" is found throughout federal and state banking
statutes and regulations. In addition to the Community Reinvestment Act's mandate that
institutions "serve the convenience and needs of the communities in which they are chartered
to do business," 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(1), the concept of "convenience and needs" is also
included in section three of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2), the Bank




tators have suggested, that CRA evaluations will play an increasingly central
role in merger analyses. Additionally, this Article suggests that community
reinvestment analysis could become the sole standard against which conven-
ience and needs are measured.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the development of bank
antitrust standards. A discussion of the changing nature of competitive
factors in bank merger analysis is contained in Part II. Part III looks at
changes in community reinvestment regulation and its relation to the con-
venience and needs standard. In conclusion, the Article suggests that com-
munity reinvestment may move from a central factor in the convenience
and needs analysis to the sole measure of a transaction's effect on the
convenience and needs of a community.
I. BANK ANTITRUST STANDARDS
Bank mergers, as a general matter, are subject to the same antitrust
standards as mergers in other industries.9 There are, however, important
differences. The development of the concept of "convenience and needs"
in bank merger analysis accounts for most of these differences.
Federal law has regulated bank merger activity since 1956, when Congress
enacted the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA)10 in order to restrict the
undue concentration of banking resources and to limit the geographic
expansion of bank holding companies. 1 With the passage of the BHCA,
which reached only mergers involving bank holding companies, 2 and the
passage of the Bank Merger Act 3 in 1960, it was thought that bank mergers
9. Kinter & Bauer, Competition at the Teller's Window?: Altered Antitrust Standards for
Banks and Other Financial Institutions, 35 U. KAN. L. Rnv. 657 (1987); Tortoriello, Structuring
a Friendly Bank Acquisition: Corporate, Securities and Related Considerations, in BANK
ACQUISITONS AND TxAKovans 140 (R. Sheehan et al. eds., 1989).
10. Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850
(1988 & Supp. 1 1989)).
11. E. SymONS & J. Wmin, supra note 5, at 44. The 1956 Act, which regulated companies
holding two or more banks, was amended in 1970 to also regulate companies holding just one
bank. Act of Dec. 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607 § 101, 84 Stat. 1760.
12. Specifically, the BHCA makes it
unlawful, except with the prior approval of the [Federal Reserve] Board, (1) for
any action to be taken that causes any company to become a bank holding
company; (2) for any action to be taken that causes a bank to become a
subsidiary of a bank holding company; (3) for any bank holding company to
acquire direct or indirect ownership or control of any voting shares of any bank
if, after such acquisition, such company will directly or indirectly own or control
more than 5 percentum of the voting shares of such bank; (4) for any bank
holding company or subsidiary thereof, other than a bank, to acquire all or
substantially all of the assets of a bank; or (5) for any bank holding company
to merge or consolidate with any other bank holding company.
12 U.S.C. § 1842(a).
13. Pub. L. No. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129 (1960) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)).
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were immune from scrutiny under the standards of section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act of 1890'4 and section 7 of the Clayton Act. 5 This immunity,
however, proved to be a fiction.
The Department of Justice in United States v. Philadelphia National
Bank 6 argued successfully that bank mergers were within the reach of
section 7 of the Clayton Act. 7 In Philadelphia National Bank, the Comp-
troller of the Currency (OCC) had approved the merger of two large
Philadelphia banks.' This approval was granted despite the fact that the
Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
and the Department of Justice had found that the "proposed merger would
have substantial anticompetitive effects."' 9 In response to the banks' argu-
ment that the merger would stimulate economic development in the Phila-
delphia area, the Court held that a merger likely to lessen competition
cannot be "saved because ... [of] some ultimate reckoning of social or
economic debits and credits." ' 20 The Court stated that Congress's "value
choice" to proscribe anticompetitive mergers reached benign and malignant
mergers alike. 2'
As a result of Philadelphia National Bank, amendments were made to
the 1956 BHCA and to the 1960 Bank Merger Act in 1966. 22 The 1966
amendments, like Philadelphia National Bank, recognized the right of the
Department of Justice to challenge bank mergers on anticompetitive grounds.
More importantly, however, the amendments provided that otherwise pro-
14. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § I
(West. Supp. 1991)).
15. Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
18). The language of section 7 provides as a general rule that:
No person engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly ... the
whole or any part of the assets of another person also engaged in commerce, or
in any activity affecting commerce where in any line of commerce in any section
of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
Id. (emphasis added).
The uncertainty concerning whether section 7 of the Clayton Act applied to bank mergers
was due to a large extent to the fact that "section 7 makes no reference to 'mergers' (nor to
'consolidations')." Kinter & Bauer, supra note 9, at 664.
16. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
17. See Kinter & Bauer, supra note 9, at 662-63. The following year the Court also
determined that the standards of section I of the Sherman Act also apply to bank mergers.
United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
18. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 333. The merger involved the Philadelphia National
Bank and the Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank, the second and third largest banks in the
Philadelphia metropolitan area. Id. at 330-31.
19. Id. at 332-33.
20. Id. at 371.
21. Id.
22. Bank Merger Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-356, 80 Stat. 7 (1966) (amending the 1960
Bank Merger Act); Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, 80 Stat. 236 (amending the 1956
BHCA). See Kinter & Bauer, supra note 9, at 665-67.
[Vol. 67:331
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT
hibited anticompetitive mergers could be lawful if their adverse competitive
effects were clearly outweighed by their beneficial effects in meeting the
"convenience and needs of the community." '2
Portions of the principal statutory provisions that govern bank mergers
and acquisitions24 rely on the statutory language of the Sherman and Clayton
Acts. However, these statutory provisions are fundamentally distinct from
general antitrust laws because they contain "the convenience and needs of
the community" defense. 25 While it is well established that bank regulators
are required to apply general antitrust standards in evaluating the anticom-
petitive effects of proposed mergers, the analysis of competition is only
part of the relevant inquiry.
In bank mergers and acquisitions the responsible regulator26 must engage
23. The 1966 amendments to section 3 of the BHCA revised the section to provide that
the Board shall not approve
any other proposed acquisition or merger or consolidation whose effect in any
section of the country may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to
create a monopoly, or which in any other manner would be a restraint of trade,
unless it finds that the anti-competitive effects of the proposed transaction are
clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction
in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served.
Pub. L. No. 89-485, 80 Stat. 236 (emphasis added). The Bank Merger Act of 1966, amending
the 1960 Act, in similar language also combines the standard of section 7 and the "convenience
and needs" defense. Pub. L. No. 89-356, 80 Stat. 7. The 1966 amendments also limited the
amount of time available to the Department of Justice to challenge a merger to 30 days
following approval of the merger by the appropriate regulator. The amendments, however,
also provided that a bank merger challenged by the Department of Justice would be auto-
matically stayed. See R. PosNE & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRusT CASES, EcoNoMIc Norms, AND
OTrER MATERLs 491-93 (2d ed. 1981); E. SymoNs & J. WE=r, supra note 5, at 511-13.
24. Section 3 of the BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c); Bank Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5);
Change in Bank Control Act, 12 U.S.C. § 18170)(7).
25. See Kinter & Bauer, supra note 9, at 657-58, 677-78; Tortoriello, supra note 9, at 141.
26. Determining which statutes control a merger or an acquisition and which regulatory
agency reviews the transaction depends on the nature of the transaction and the charter of
the acquiring or surviving bank and whether a bank holding company is a party to the
proposed transaction. If the BHCA reaches the transaction, approval by the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve Board will be necessary. If the transaction falls within the Change in
Bank Control Act, approval must be obtained from the "appropriate Federal banking agency."
The "appropriate agency" is (1) the Comptroller of the Currency in the case of a national
banking association; (2) the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in the case of
a state-chartered bank that is a Federal Reserve member bank; (3) the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation in the case of a state-chartered insured bank that is not a member of the Federal
Reserve; and (4) the Office of Thrift Supervision in the case of a savings association or a
savings and loan holding company. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q). If the transaction is governed by the
Bank Merger Act, the "responsible agency" from whom approval must be given is (1) the
Comptroller of the Currency if the acquiring, assuming, or resulting bank is to be a national
bank; (2) the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System if the acquiring, assuming,
or resulting bank is to be a state-chartered member bank; (3) the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation if the acquiring, assuming, or resulting bank is to be a state-chartered insured
nonmember bank; and (4) the Office of Thrift Supervision if the acquiring, assuming, or
resulting institution is to be a savings association. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2).
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in a three-part evaluation. 27 The first part is a competitive analysis; 28 the
second, a safety and soundness evaluation; 29 and the third, a convenience
and needs inquiry.30 The initial evaluation requires the regulator, after
delineating the relevant geographic and product markets,31 to decide whether
the proposed transaction will either create a monopoly, further a combi-
nation or conspiracy to monopolize, or substantially lessen competition.
The safety and soundness evaluation addresses the financial and managerial
resources of the parties to the proposed transaction. This involves, among
other factors, the sources of capital for the transaction, the capitalization
of the institutions involved, the competence and experience of management
personnel, and the future prospects of the proposed and existing institutions.
If the proposed merger is not precluded because of safety and soundness
concerns but is deemed to have significant anticompetitive effects, the
regulator must then evaluate whether the probable effects of the transaction
in meeting the convenience and needs of bank customers in the local
community outweigh the potentially anticompetitive effects of the transac-
tion. This inquiry requires the reckoning of social and economic debits and
credits that was rejected in the Philadelphia National Bank case.32
II. THE CHANGING NATURE OF "COMPETITION"
While competition remains a central theme in evaluating the merits of
bank mergers and acquisitions, the relevant markets are undergoing pro-
found changes. The deregulation of financial services3 3 has made it increas-
27. See Mattingly & Frierson, Contested Bank Acquisitions: The Fed's Perspective, in
BANK AcQuISmONS AND TAKEovEPS, supra note 9, at 365 (1989).
28. See BHCA § 3(C)(1), (2); Bank Merger Act § 5(A), (B); Change in Bank Control Act
§ 7(A), (B) (setting out general standards of Sherman Act and Clayton Act).
29. BHCA § 3(c); Bank Merger Act § 5; Change in Bank Control Act § 7(C), (F) (financial
and managerial resources, safety and soundness of institutions involved, financial stability of
institution being acquired, risk of adverse effect on Bank or Savings Association Insurance
Funds).
30. BHCA § 3(c)(2); Bank Merger Act § 5(B); Change in Bank Control Act § 7(B)
("probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the community
to be served").
31. Both the relevant geographic and product markets in which the merger will have a
direct and immediate effect must be established to determine the probable competitive effects
of a contemplated merger. "Product markets" are denoted in section 7 of the Clayton Act
by the phrase "line of commerce" and "geographic markets" by the language "section of the
country." See H. HovENKAmp, EcoNomcs AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 3.3, at 62, § 3.5,
at 70 (1985).
32. 374 U.S. at 371. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
33. Important legislation deregulating financial services and particularly diminishing the
line between commercial banks and savings and loans includes the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat.
132 (expanding powers of federal savings and loan associations), and the Garn-St. Germain
[Vol. 67:331
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ingly difficult to determine what unique "cluster of products" 34 constitutes
a particular product market. Federal bank regulatory agencies have recog-
nized, to varying degrees, both that nonbank institutions compete with
commercial banks for deposits and to provide bank services and that such
factors must be weighed in evaluating the competitive impact of particular
transactions.
With respect to product markets, most of the debate focuses on the
inclusion of thrift services and deposits in the commercial banking line of
commerce. The OCC has for several years been characterized as pro-merger.
In the early 1980s, one authority attributed to the OCC the view "that the
realities of the marketplace require that competition from thrift institutions
be considered in defining the appropriate product market and in assessing
the competitive effects of a commercial bank merger proposal. ' 35 The
Comptroller's position that thrifts compete directly with commercial banks
has gradually moved from dicta in early decisions to specific findings that
thrifts and commercial banks are engaged in the same "line of commerce. '3 6
Federal Reserve Board acquisition approvals also indicate a strong movement
toward the position that thrifts and commercial banks should be included
in the same product market.3 7 This position is particularly apparent where
including thrift services in the commercial banking product market would
diminish the severity of the market concentration resulting from a particular
transaction.' The FDIC has an established pattern of including thrift market
shares in evaluating commercial bank merger transactions. 9 Policy state-
ments by the FDIC have increasingly supported the inclusion of broad
Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (expanding savings
and loan powers, and allowing money market accounts to compete with mutual funds). See
also Tortoriello, supra note 9, at 148, noting that recent legislation has
significantly broadened the powers of thrift institutions respecting consumer and
commercial lending and deposit-taking, fiduciary and credit card services and the
like, and removed significant differences between thrifts and commercial banks.
Thrifts now offer virtually complete deposit and loan services to their household
customers and have become strong potential competitors for banking services to
business customers.
(citation omitted).
34. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963).
35. Speech by Richard V. Fitzgerald, Thoughts on Antitrust Policy, before the Ninth
Annual Conference on Legal Problems in Bank Regulation, San Francisco, Cal., Sept. 23,
1982, and Washington, D.C., Oct. 18, 1982, reprinted in 4 OFF. Compmounn Q.J. 27 (Dec.
1982).
36. Tortoriello, supra note 9, at 145-46 (citing numerous decisions of the Comptroller in
the early and mid-1980s).
37. Id. at 143-45 (citing Federal Reserve Board decisions approving acquisitions that would
have substantially reduced competition on a "bank-only" basis).
38. See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
39. Tortoriello, supra note 9, at 146 (citations omitted).
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product lines in evaluating the competitive impact of bank merger trans-
actions.0
The view that thrifts and other nonbank entities should be included in
an evaluation of the commercial banking line of commerce is consistent
with the Supreme Court's conclusion in United States v. Connecticut Na-
tional Bank.41 In that case, the Court held that continued product devel-
opment among savings banks would ultimately make distinctions from
commercial banking unrealistic for purposes of a Clayton Act analysis. 42
Distinctions between commercial banks and savings and loans for purposes
of antitrust analysis are also less realistic in light of the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 198941 (FIRREA). FIRREA
amends section 4 of the BHCA44 to allow banks and bank holding companies
to acquire healthy thrift institutions. 45 This removal of ownership and
affiliation restrictions suggests further expansion of commercial banking
product markets in antitrust analysis.
Despite the erosion of traditional geographic restrictions on banking,
geographic market definitions continue to focus on generally localized
markets, in which the competitive effects of a transaction "will be direct
and immediate.""6 Like definitions of the relevant line of commerce, how-
ever, definitions of the relevant "section of the country" appear to be less
rigid than definitions earlier authority might have been construed to re-
quire.47
The effect of changing market definitions on the competitive analysis of
merger transactions is illustrated by the Federal Reserve Board's order,
under the BHCA, in connection with an application by First Union Cor-
poration (First Union), a North Carolina-based bank holding company, to
acquire a Florida-based bank holding company.48 In the order, the Federal
Reserve Board approved First Union's acquisition of Florida National Bank
of Florida, Incorporated (Florida National), a financially troubled holding
company with subsidiary banks throughout Florida. First Union was, prior
40. Id. (referring to FDIC Policy Statement, 53 Fed. Reg. 39,803 (proposed Oct. 12,
1988)).
41. 418 U.S. 656 (1974).
42. Id. at 666. See, e.g., Hicks, Commercial Loans Loom Larger at Top 100 Savings
Institutions, Am. Banker, May 6, 1988, at 1.
43. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183.
44. 12 U.S.C. § 1843.
45. FIRREA § 601. See also Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control;
Acquisition and Operation of Savings Associations by Bank Holding Companies, 54 Fed. Reg.
37,297 (Sept. 8, 1989) (amending regulations promulgated pursuant to § 4 of BHCA).
46. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. at 357.
47. See Tortoriello, supra note 9, at 150-55, and Kinter & Bauer, supra note 9, at 672-73,
for discussion of case authority and analysis of positions of the various federal banking
regulators on appropriate considerations in defining relevant geographic market in connection
with analysis of competitive effects of particular transactions.
48. First Union Corp., 76 Fed. Reserve Bull. 83 (1990).
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to the acquisition, the fifth largest banking organization in Florida, con-
trolling 6.6% of the commercial bank deposits in the state. Florida National
was the sixth largest organization with 5.8% of the deposits. In the Jack-
sonville market, where the two holding companies each operated directly
competing banks, First Union controlled the third largest of nineteen com-
mercial banks, holding 24.1% of the commercial deposits. The contemplated
acquisition created a post-merger firm with almost half of the area's
commercial deposits and a market with a concentration index49 far beyond
the Department of Justice Merger Guidelines. 50
Despite the fact that consummation of the acquisition of Florida National
by First Union would eliminate a major competitor in an already concen-
trated Jacksonville banking market, the Board approved the merger, finding
"a number of factors [that] mitigate the competitive effects of [the] pro-
posal."' Of particular importance in the Board's mitigation analysis was
the presence of thrift institutions in the market, which compete for deposits
and offer comparable services. Finding that this added competitive influence,
the Board effectively expanded the relevant line of commerce. This expansion
significantly reduced the post-merger concentration index52 and contributed
to the Board's decision to approve what might traditionally have been
perceived as an anticompetitive merger.
49. "Market concentration" refers to the number of firms in a particular market as well
as to their respective share in that market. "Concentration" is a central theme in merger
analysis because of the underlying policy of section 7 of the Clayton Act that mergers should
not be permitted to create or enhance market power.
50. The 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (June 29,
1984), measure market concentration, before and after a proposed transaction, by means of
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The index is calculated by summing the squares of
the individual market shares of all the firms included in the relevant product and geographic
market. The index divides market concentration into three regions, broadly categorized as
"unconcentrated" (HHI below 1000), "moderately concentrated" (HHI between 1000 and
1800), and "highly concentrated" (HHI above 1800). The HHI for the pre-merger Jacksonville
market was 1955. Upon completion of the transaction the HHI increased by 1236 points to
3191. First Union Corp., 76 Fed. Reserve Bull. at 84.
General standards for horizontal mergers provide that transactions in markets where the
post-merger HHI is below 1000 will not be challenged, except in unusual circumstances. A
transaction where the post-merger HHI is between 1000 and 1800 is also unlikely to be
challenged, provided that the post-merger index is not more than 100 points higher than the
pre-merger index. In a highly concentrated market, where the concentration is greater than
1800, a transaction which increases the index by more than 50 points is a probable candidate
for a Justice Department challenge. Banks, as a general rule, are subject to relatively higher
thresholds before an antitrust violation is deemed to exist. See DeMott, supra note 5, at 858-
59 (stating that bank acquisition will not be challenged unless post-acquisition HHI is over
1800 and acquisition increases HHI by at least 200 points, and that an even higher HHI will
not result in a challenge to a transaction involving the acquisition of a troubled institution).
51. First Union Corp., 76 Fed. Reserve Bull. at 84.
52. By including 50 percent of the deposits held by thrift institutions in the calculation of
market concentration, First Union's market share was 39.9%, and the HHI increased by 768
points to 2238. Id. at 85 & n.11.
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The First Union approval, while a move away from earlier direct com-
petition standards, is not an isolated departure from what might be seen as
a more traditional antitrust analysis of bank mergers. The dilution of direct
competition standards, through the expansion of the relevant product mar-
kets, has been an increasingly frequent feature of regulatory analysis in
bank mergers. The Federal Reserve Board, in a divided vote, recently
approved a merger between First Hawaiian, Inc. (First Hawaiian) and First
Interstate of Hawaii (First Interstate), respectively, Hawaii's second and
fourth largest banking organizations. 53 The Department of Justice objected
to the transaction, claiming that the merger, among other things, would
decrease competition in commercial lending.54 The Board, in its November
30 order, rejected the Justice Department's argument that only thrifts with
significant lending activities should be included in the analysis of competitive
factors. The Board included fifty percent of thrift deposits in calculating
market concentration. Additionally, the Board noted that it would "consider
the competitive effects of thrifts on a fully weighted basis where the record
indicates [that] approach is appropriate. '55
In addition to the inclusion of thrifts in product market definitions, the
potential competition doctrine has diminished as a factor in bank merger
decisions. 56 The Department of Justice's challenges to bank mergers on
potential competition grounds have been uniformly unsuccessful.5 7 While
53. First Hawaiian, Inc., 77 Fed. Reserve Bull. 52 (1991); See also Fed Approves Hawaiian
Bank Mergers Over Justice Department Objections, 59 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
834 (Dec. 6, 1990) (discussing order); Fed Approves Hawaiian Merger, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA)
926 (Dec. 10, 1990).
54. The Justice Department's objections were in the form of a 50-page report outlining
the anticompetitive effects of the proposed merger. The report took the additional step of
evaluating the convenience and needs test. The evaluation concluded that all convenience and
needs benefits could be produced without the acquisition. Justice Dept. Objects to Bank
Merger Proposal, Citing Anti-Competitive Effects, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) 608 (Oct. 15,
1990).
55. First Hawaiian Inc., 77 Fed. Reserve Bull. at 55 n.20. After the First Hawaiian order
was issued, the Department of Justice filed suit to block the merger, claiming that the proposed
acquisition violates section 7 of the Clayton Act and, particularly, that it threatens small and
medium-sized businesses in the state by eliminating only one of a few banks serving such
customers. United States v. First Hawaiian, Inc., No. 90-00904 (D.C. Hawaii filed Dec. 28,
1990). The Department of Justice challenged, inter alia, the Board's inclusion of thrifts in its
evaluation of the competitive effects of the merger. Justice Files Antitrust Suit to Block
Hawaiian Bank Merger, 56 Banking Rep. (BNA) 21 (Jan. 7, 1991). A settlement agreement
was reached shortly after the suit was filed, with the bank agreeing to several divestitures.
Justice, Hawaiian Banks Settle Antitrust Suit by Divestitures, 56 Banking Rep. (BNA) 523
(Mar. 19, 1991).
56. For a general discussion of the potential competition doctrine, see Shepherd, Potential
Competition Versus Actual Competition, 42 ADMnr. L. REV. 5, 34 (1990) (concluding that
appraisal of existing degree of monopoly power, and not entry barriers posed by potential
competition, provides the main source of "guidance for policy decisions about real markets").
57. See Republic of Texas Corp. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve, 649 F.2d 1026
(5th Cir. 1981) (Board denial of acquisition application on potential competition grounds set
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competition remains a central factor in bank merger analysis, it is readily
apparent, as both the First Union and First Hawaiian approvals suggest,
that federal banking regulators are willing to recognize that the nature of
the relevant competition is changing. This changing view of competition in
merger applications has been accompanied by an increased focus on con-
venience and needs. Also, with respect to the analysis of convenience,
increasingly closer attention has been given to community reinvestment
records.
The concept of "convenience and needs" to date is without well-defined
boundaries. The concept has been tied to a failing bank situation" but is
clearly not limited to such.59 Because there is a relationship between con-
venience and needs and the failing company doctrine, a number of the
factors which regulators have accepted as enhancing convenience and needs
are probably more accurately characterized as "safety and soundness"
considerations. Safety and soundness factors have been recognized (as part
of the convenience and needs defense) where the challenged acquisition
improves the financial and managerial resources of the target bank6° and
also where it is believed that the acquisition will produce operating efficien-
cies. Perceived increases in the competitiveness of a target bank through its
association with a larger institution,6' expansion or improvement of the
target's services, and the potential for improved rates on loans and deposits
by the target have also been included in the "wide range of benefits and
economies that could improve services to the community." 62
III. THE EVOLUTION OF "CoMMUNITY REIqVESTMENT"
The Community Reinvestment Act of 197763 was enacted in response to
concerns that bank redlining practices were contributing to the decline of
aside because of absence of findings concerning market concentration, probable entrants, and
target's position as a market leader). See also United States v. Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. 602
(1974); Kinter & Bauer, supra note 9, at 676-77 (indicating that the potential competition
doctrine "has since Marine Bancorporation been notably unavailing in government challenges
to most such transactions").
58. Tortoriello, supra note 9, at 134-35.
59. Kinter & Bauer, supra note 9, at 681 n.127 ("In light of the more serious impact of
a bank failure than failure in an unregulated sector, the 'convenience and needs' defense is
more liberal and thus subsumes the failing company doctrine.").
60. E.g., First Interstate Bank of Washington, 2 OFF. COMPTROLLER Q.J. 112 (June 1989).
61. See Marion Nat'l Bank, 2 OFF. CoMPTRoL.ER Q.J. 126 (Sept. 1983).
62. Tortoriello, supra note 9, at 135. For a general discussion of the convenience and
needs defense, see Kinter & Bauer, supra note 9, at 677-81.
63. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (1977).
64. Black's defines redlining as a "pattern of discrimination in which financial institutions
refuse to make mortgage loans, regardless of credit record of the applicant, on properties in
specified areas because of alleged deteriorating conditions." BLAcK's LAw DICnONARY 1279
(6th ed. 1990). Redlining includes a number of practices such as refusing to make loans secured
by property in certain areas, refusing to accept loan applications from certain areas, refusing
to grant loans in certain areas on prevailing terms, and refusing to grant loans on property
older than a certain age. Schellie, supra note 3, at 943 n.2.
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older urban neighborhoods. 6 Although the Act uses the terms "convenience
and needs," like the bank antitrust statutes, the Act creates an affirmative
credit obligation rather than a potential defense. Unlike other redlining
statutes," the Act does not provide for any direct civil or criminal penalties.
The CRA employs primarily indirect sanctions, including delays in or even
denials of acquisition, merger, or branching requests. 67
The CRA empowers each of the financial regulatory agencies to prom-
ulgate regulations" implementing Congress's mandate that "regulated fi-
nancial institutions ... serve the convenience and needs of the communities
in which they are chartered to do business." 6 9 The agency regulations require
banks to adopt and review CRA policy statements70 and to maintain a
record of public comments on the bank's performance in meeting local
credit needs. 7' Regulators, in assessing an institution's CRA performance,
are required to evaluate twelve assessment factors, which reflect the bank's
65. Schellie, supra note 3, at 943 n.2.
66. Attempts prior to the Community Reinvestment Act to control redlining practices
included the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (amended 1988), prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin in the financing of
homes, and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act requiring the collection and disclosure of
lending records. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2811 (1979).
67. Financial regulatory agencies are required to take community reinvestment records into
consideration in evaluating institutions' applications for "deposit facilities." 12 U.S.C. § 2903.
An application for a "deposit facility" for purposes of the CRA includes requests for (1)
charters; (2) deposit insurance; (3) branching approvals; (4) office relocations; and (5) mergers,
consolidations, and acquisitions. 12 U.S.C. § 2902(3). See Schellie, supra note 3, at 944 &
n.5.
See also. Questions and Answers Regarding the Community Reinvestment Act, 5 Fed. Banking
L. Rep. (CCH) 59,349 (Feb. 2, 1990), noting, in response to a question concerning sanctions
available to agencies, that:
A poor CRA performance record may result in denial of an application. The
agencies may also use the full range of their enforcement powers to ensure
compliance with the requirements of the CRA regulations, such as preparing a
CRA Statement, maintaining public comment files, and providing the public
notice. In addition, prohibited discriminatory or other illegal credit practices
which are adverse factors under CRA, will also result in sanctions under the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, federal fair housing laws, or other commercial
credit protection laws.
Id.
68. 12 U.S.C. § 2905. Regulations by the various financial supervisory agencies imple-
menting the CRA can be found at 12 C.F.R. §§ 25. (OCC), 228 (FRB), 345 (FDIC), 563e
(Office of Thrift Supervision) (1991).
In addition to these regulations the federal bank regulatory agencies in March of 1989 issued
a detailed policy statement outlining the requirements of the CRA. Federal Bank Regulatory
Agencies' Joint Statement on Information Requirement of the Community Reinvestment Act,
54 Fed. Reg. 13,742 (April 5, 1989), reprinted in 5 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 59,348
(April 14, 1989) [hereinafter Statement].
69. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(1).
70. 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.4, 228.4, 345.4, 563e.4.
71. 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.5,'228.5, 345.5, 563e.5.
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community involvement.72 On the basis of these assessment factors, an
institution's performance is evaluated, and a CRA rating of "outstanding,"
"satisfactory," "needs improvement," or "substantial noncompliance" is
assigned.7 1
Amendments to CRA contained in FIRREA74 require that the results of
a CRA examination appear in "a written evaluation of the institution's
record of meeting the credit needs of its entire community, including low-
and moderate-income neighborhoods. '"75 The written evaluation is required
to contain both a public and a confidential section, with the public section
being made available to the public for any CRA examination conducted on
or after July 1, 1990.76
Since the passage of the Act, few branching or merger requests have been
denied on CRA grounds. This is unlikely to continue to be the case. In
recent years, several branching, merger, and conversion requests have been
delayed on CRA grounds.77 The increased focus of regulators on the CRA,
evidenced by the 1989 joint CRA statement,78 the FIRREA amendments to
the CRA, and the success community groups have experienced in challenging
72. 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.7, 228.7, 345.7, 563e.7. The assessment factors include: (1) the activities
of the bank to ascertain credit needs of its community; (2) the bank's marketing practices; (3)
the participation of the board of directors in formulating and reviewing CRA policies; (4)
practices by the bank that discourage particular types of credit applications; (5) the bank's
geographic distribution of credit; (6) evidence that the bank has engaged in illegal practices;
(7) the opening and closing of bank offices; (8) involvement of the bank in development and
redevelopment projects; (9) home mortgage, small business, and small farm loans by the bank;
(10) the bank's participation in government-issued loan programs; (11) the bank's resources in
meeting community credit needs; and (12) other factors which reasonably bear on the extent
to which a bank is meeting credit needs. Id.
73. 12 U.S.C. § 2906(b)(2). See also OCC Exam Guidelines on CRA Compliance Target
Performance on Credit, Outreach, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) 137 (July 23, 1990).
74. Pub. L. No. 101-71 § 1212(b), 103 Stat. 183 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2906), amends
the Community Reinvestment Act to require, beginning July 1, 1990, public disclosure of an
examining agency's CRA evaluation of an institution. See Special Report (No. 1298) Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
1204 (Aug. 18, 1989).
75. 12 U.S.C. § 2906(a)(1).
76. 12 U.S.C. § 2906(a)(2), (b). Debate has been generated by FIRREA's amendment to
the CRA calling for the public disclosure of institutions' CRA records beginning in July 1990.
Bankers have expressed concern that such disclosures amount to public confessions of CRA-
related shortcomings and will place ammunition in the hands of community groups. Traiger,
'Mea Culpa' Can Enhance a Bank's CRA Statement, Am. Banker, Mar. 7, 1990, at 4. Concern
has also been expressed that a mechanism to appeal a CRA compliance rating should be in
place before disclosure is mandated. Leander, Banks' Appeals of CRA Ratings May Go to
Court, Am. Banker, Feb. 1, 1990, at 6; Kantrow, As Public Evaluations Near, Banks Seek
Right to Appeal, Am. Banker, Feb. 5, 1990, at 8.
77. See, e.g., Mitsui Bank Withdraws Application for Conversion of Nonbank Trust Unit,
57 Banking Rep. (BNA) 173 (July 29, 1991) (withdrawal followed public meetings expressing
CRA deficiencies).
78. See Statement, supra note 68; Eisen & Dennen, supra note 2, at 337-39.
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merger and acquisition applications on CRA grounds all indicate that this
trend will continue. 9
CRA compliance is gradually moving from being a relevant factor in the
assessment of a proposed transaction's noncompetitive effects toward being
a controlling factor. The substantial attention given by regulators to an
acquiring institution's CRA record reflects a regulatory belief that "financial
institutions that make meeting their responsibilities under the CRA an
integral part of their management and operational structure are best able
to ... [meet] the credit needs of their entire communities, including low-
and moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent with safe and sound op-
erations." 8 0
Most CRA-related challenges do not result in the denial of a merger
application. Instead, the acquiring institution and the protesting community
group (or regulatory agency) usually reach a settlement.8 ' Though the form
of a settlement may vary substantially, institutions are generally required to
make substantial CRA commitments, usually in the form of loan commit-
ments for a certain dollar amount.8 2 CRA commitments generally win
regulator approval for a transaction.83 Continental Illinois Bancorp's appli-
79. See, e.g., CR-A Hurdles Get Higher, BANC ExPANsioN REPORTER 4-6 (Sept. 19, 1988)(summarizing Federal Reserve Board decisions addressing CRA issues); Podger, Forecast '87,
Am. Banker, Dec. 1, 1986, at 9 (indicating that CRA protests increased over 500% between
1984 and the beginning of 1987).
Community groups have increasingly used the CRA, not only to challenge mergers, but also
as a lever to insure that lending policies actually meet the community's perception of their
own credit needs. In a rather unusual context for the CRA, an Iowa citizens group utilized
the CRA as a factor in reaching an agreement with the state's largest banking organizations
to set aside $13 million for new borrowers who own small farms. The agreement also provides
for regular disclosure of small-farm lending activities to community groups. Kantrow, Rein-
vestment Act Is Used in Iowa to Aid Small Farms, Am. Banker, Mar. 12, 1990, at 8.
80. Crestar Financial Corp., 75 Fed. Reserve Bull. 382 (1989). See also Core States Financial
Corp., 76 Fed. Reserve Bull. 176, 178-79 (1990).
81. Schellie, supra note 3, at 946-48.
82. Id.
83. The joint CRA policy statement issued in March of 1989, supra note 69, suggests that
CRA commitments can mitigate, but only to a limited extent, the absence of an established
record of CRA compliance. This need for an established record, in the place of future CRA
commitments, formed the basis of a dissent by Governor Rice from a Federal Reserve Board
approval of an application by Advance Bancorp, Inc. of Chicago to acquire a Chicago savings
bank, despite a poor CRA record. See FED Rules Illinois Thrift May Form Bank Holding
Company Despite CRA Violations, 47 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) 699 (Oct. 27, 1986). More
recently, the Massachusetts Board of Bank Incorporation denied the application of BayBanks
Inc. seeking Board approval to vote the stock of its subsidiaries as part of a planned
reorganization on the basis of the "less than satisfactory performance of the bank's Boston
area subsidiary in the area of community lending." Massachusetts Banking Office Denies
BHC's Application Based on Bad CRA Performance, 54 Banking Rep. (BNA) 333 (Feb. 26,
1990). The state board noted that while it was "encouraged by steps taken by BayBanks to
improve its community reinvestment position ... planned or future CRA related activities do
not offset an otherwise unsatisfactory past record." Id. (emphasis added). The action by the
Massachusetts regulators indicates the CRA could become a factor with respect to state as
well as federal regulatory applications.
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cation to the Federal Reserve Board to acquire an Arizona bank, however,
illustrates that commitments are not always viewed as the appropriate remedy
for CRA deficiencies.84
Continental applied to the Board under section 3 of the BHCA to acquire
all of the voting shares of Grand Canyon State Bank, a small state-chartered
commercial bank. The competitive effects of the merger were not at issue.
The Board's analysis instead focused on the needs of the community to be
served by Continental's present and proposed bank subsidiaries. In the
order, the Board stated that while CRA improvement commitments are
often sufficient to secure merger approval, approval would be withheld
where the acquiring institution failed to establish a record indicating "a
basic level of compliance on which the commitments can be evaluated." 5
The Continental order could become precedent for future denials in light
of statistics compiled by the federal bank regulators indicating that nearly
one out of every ten financial institutions examined with respect to CRA
compliance since July 1, 1990, received a less-than-satisfactory CRA rating. 6
In addition to the Continental order, the Federal Reserve Board recently
blocked a proposed merger between First Interstate Bancsystem of Montana,
Inc., based in Billings, Montana, and Commerce Bancshares of Wyoming,
Inc., based in Sheridan, Wyoming.87 The denial followed a protest by Native
Action, a community group located on the Northern Cheyenne Indian
Reservation, alleging that a subsidiary bank of First Interstate had failed
to take steps to address and meet the credit needs of the reservation
community. The Board agreed with the allegations, "saying that the particular
bank in question had little contact with the reservation. The Board also
noted two less-than-satisfactory CRA ratings by the FDIC. The Board
indicated that while the bank had made Small Business Administration and
other loans in its community, it had made only a limited number of loans
to members of the reservation and had taken action to improve its CRA
performance only after the merger application had been filed. As in Con-
tinental, no competitive issues were raised and the denial was based solely
on community reinvestment grounds.
At this point in the development of community reinvestment, the Conti-
nental and First Interstate orders still represent isolated circumstances in
which applications were denied solely on CRA grounds. Delays in the
approval process resulting from community group challenges, however, are
84. Continental Illinois Bancorp, Inc., 75 Fed. Reserve Bull. 304 (1989).
85. Id. at 306.
86. Consumer groups, commenting on the statistics, have expressed concern that some
institutions are being given passing ratings despite noncompliance. Regulators Find CRA
Performance Lacking for One Out of 10 Institutions Examined, 57 Banking Rep. (BNA) 137,
138 (July 22, 1991).
87. Fed Blocks Attempted BHC Merger, Cites CRA Concerns by Cheyenne Group, 57
Banking Rep. (BNA) 603 (Oct. 14, 1991).
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becoming somewhat commonplace. An example of the kind of challenges
that are occurring is the effort of the Charlotte Reinvestment Alliance to
block NCNB's acquisition of two Tampa-area branches in Florida's Amer-
ican Savings & Loan. The alliance claimed, based on a study of mortgage
lending in minority areas in Charlotte, that the bank "has done very little
in the way of community reinvestment.""8 The Charlotte group, successful
in negotiating $9 million in CRA commitments from First Union Corp. as
a result of a 1989 merger, was joined by community groups in Texas who
filed complaints alleging that NCNB failed to meet its CRA obligations in
minority areas in Austin, Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio. 9 First Union's
application to acquire Florida National9° was also delayed on CRA grounds.
In commenting on its decision to approve First Union's bid, the Federal
Reserve Board noted that "if not for the deteriorating condition of Florida
National . . . it would not have approved ... [the] bid ... [in light of
First Union's] past CRA performance." 91 More recently, shortly after the
announcement that a merger agreement had been reached between NCNB
Corp. and C&S/Sovran Corp., it was announced, apparently as part of an
effort to stave off CRA challenges, that $10 billion would be committed to
community development lending in existing NCNB and C&S/Sovran markets
over the next ten years.92 Shortly after the announcement, the Federal
Reserve Board announced that it would conduct four public hearings in
connection with NCNB's application to acquire C&S/Sovran.9a
While post-Continental Board orders suggest that CRA is not the begin-
ning and the end of the convenience and needs inquiry,9 Continental and
First Interstate do indicate that a basic level of compliance could, as a
matter of course, be a necessary condition for the approval of a merger or
branching request. 9 An established record of CRA compliance would, of
course, provide a more objective basis for determining whether a merger or
acquisition is likely to have the probable effect of meeting the convenience
88. Community Groups Protest NCNB's Record Under CRA in Florida, Texas, 55 Banking
Rep. (BNA) 613 (Oct. 15, 1990).
89. Id.
90. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
91. Fed OKs First Union Acquisition, Sets Tough CRA Compliance Conditions, 54 Banking
Rep. (BNA) 10 (Jan. 8, 1990).
92. Brannigan, NCNB, C&S Sovran Plan to Expand Lending for Community Development,
Wall St. J., Aug. 7, 1991, at A5, col. 1.
93. Fed to Hold Public Hearings in Four Cities in NCNB-C&S Sovran Merger Plan, 57
Banking Rep. (BNA) 448 (Sept. 23, 1991).
94. See, e.g., First Union Corporation, 76 Fed. Reserve Bull. 83, 87 (1989) (CRA perform-
ance is major component of the convenience and needs standard under the BHCA but is not
the only factor reviewed under that standard).
95. A poor CRA record also resulted in the denial by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB) of a branching request by Leader Federal Savings Bank of Memphis, Tennessee.
Ringer, Memphis Thrift Denied Branch on CRA Grounds, Am. Banker, July 24, 1989, at 3.
See also E. SYmoNs & J. Wrr, supra note 5, at 150.
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and needs of the community than would a commitment for future action.
CONCLUSION
The evolution of the Community Reinvestment Act from a prohibition
on redlining to an affirmative local credit obligation is increasingly being
recognized by the banking industry.9 The present impact of CRA is evi-
denced by the recent debate in connection with proposed CRA amendments
to House and Senate banking bills. The most debated proposals were those
made to "gut" the Act by exempting smaller community banks from the
requirements of the Act and those which would have made expanded banking
powers contingent on the presence of a satisfactory CRA record.97 The
reform bills approved by the Senate Banking Committee and the House
Banking Committee both contain substantive amendments to the Act.98
If a new wave of bank and thrift mergers and acquisitions is on the
horizon, it seems probable that community reinvestment's role will continue
to increase. While this increased role is unlikely to undermine or displace
the competitive aspects of bank merger and acquisition analysis, as the
recent preemptive action taken by NCNB and C&S/Sovran indicate, CRA
can be expected to be a central part of the application process. Developments
in this area of the law indicate that community reinvestment has taken on
a central role in the evaluation of convenience and needs. This role may
provide a more objective means to measure convenience and needs than
presently exists, particularly if regulatory standards continue to develop. If
current trends continue, CRA may become the sole standard for determining
whether an acquiring institution has a convenience and needs defense to an
otherwise prohibited merger. Perhaps more importantly, however, as the
level of community involvement in banking decisions continues to increase,
96. Questions concerning CRA compliance were recently addressed by Federal Reserve
Board of Governors member John P. LaWare in a two-part article in the American Bankers
Association publication ABA Bankers Weekly. Fed Governor Answers ABA 's CRA Questions,
ABA Bankers Weekly 6 (Nov. 27, 1990); La Ware Addresses Safety, Declining Ratings Issues,
ABA Bankers Weekly 6 (Dec. 4, 1990).
97. See House Banking Sets Tentative Schedule for Action on Amended Bank Reform Bill,
56 Banking Rep. (BNA) 1032 (June 3, 1991); Bill Modernization, supra note 4; Maio,
Subcommittee OKs Bill with CRA Relief, ABA Bankers Weekly 1 (May 28, 1991).
98. The Senate bill mandates that regulators develop measures to assist institutions in
complying with CRA and also requires that examiners disclose the statistical data they rely on
in assessing a bank's CRA performance. S. 543, 102d Cong., Ist Sess., 137 CoNG. REc. S2627
(daily ed. Mar. 5, 1991). The House bill requires a study by regulators and the GAO on ways
to improve compliance with and the enforcement of CRA. H.R. 6, 102d Cong., Ist Sess., 137
CONG. REc. H8808 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1991). Both bills require separate CRA evaluations for
banking activities in different states and also require banks to notify depositors in advance of
any branch closings. A comparison of the two bills is contained in Comparison of House and
Senate Banking Bills Shows Key Similarities, But Effort in Trouble, 57 Banking Rep. (BNA)
298 (Sept. 19, 1991).
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a CRA record could become the measure of an institution's "political
correctness" and as such could be the basis for deposit decisions" and
decisions concerning appropriate banking powers'0° as well for decisions
with respect to branching and merger and acquisition requests.
99. A resolution adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association
(ABA) in February of this year calls for the ABA to place its deposits in institutions based
on CRA ratings. The resolution also calls on state and local bar associations to use CRA
ratings "as a significant factor" in deternimng where to place their accounts. Twelve state
and local governments currently have laws in place requiring that CRA ratings be considered
as part of the decision as to where public funds are deposited. Bar Association Consumer
Groups Endorse Depositing Funds in High CRA-Rated Banks, 56 Banking Rep. (BNA) 733
(Apr. 22, 1991).
100. See, e.g., supra notes 4 and 83 noting, respectively, proposal to tie "modernization"
powers to CRA and state regulator's action denying holding company power to vote stock of
subsidiaries on CRA grounds.
